Studying returns of U.S. equities from July 1962 through December 1997, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001, hereafter CLMX) document a steady increase in the idiosyncratic volatility of individual firms, while the aggregate market volatility and industry volatilities remained roughly constant through time. This apparent rise in idiosyncratic volatility has become one of the most actively researched asset pricing puzzles, with several recent articles trying to explain the phenomenon. The proposed explanations include increased institutional ownership (Bennett, Sias, and Starks 2003; Xu and Malkiel 2003) ; firm fundamentals having become more volatile (Wei and Zhang 2006) or opaque (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 2006) ; newly listed firms becoming increasingly younger (Fink et al. 2009 ) and riskier (Brown and Kapadia 2007) ; and product markets becoming more competitive (Irvine and Pontiff 2009) .
In this article, we show that during recent years, idiosyncratic volatility has fallen substantially, reversing any time trend evident during the 1962-1997 sample period studied by CLMX. We also find that the late 1990s surge and 2000s reversal in idiosyncratic volatility is most evident in firms with low stock prices and limited institutional ownership. We conclude from this evidence that the time-series behavior of idiosyncratic volatility is more likely to reflect an episodic phenomenon than a time trend. This raises the question of whether we can tie this episode of high idiosyncratic volatility to some sensible economic phenomenon.
We show that the episodic idiosyncratic volatility phenomenon manifests itself more strongly among low-priced stocks, which are stocks that are held proportionally more by retail investors than institutions. Not only do many institutions shy away from holding low-priced stocks for prudence reasons but fixed per-share trading costs also increase the transaction costs associated with actively trading large positions in low-priced stocks. We therefore hypothesize that the observed idiosyncratic volatility pattern is at least partially induced by trading on the part of retail investors. The bulk of our analysis provides evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Using retail trading data from a large U.S. brokerage house and small-trades data from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) as well as from the Institute for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM) databases, we provide several pieces of evidence that confirm an association between retail trading behavior and idiosyncratic volatility.
First, we show that idiosyncratic volatility levels are higher and volatility trends are more evident among low-priced stocks that are held primarily by retail investors. Among low-priced stocks, strong idiosyncratic volatility patterns are evident only if those low-priced stocks have high levels of retail trading. Next, we show that when stock splits mechanically reduce the stock price, idiosyncratic volatility rises. Importantly, we demonstrate that price changes influence idiosyncratic volatility through the trading activities of retail investors in ways that are consistent with our conjecture. When we consider other salient "attention-grabbing" events (large positive or negative returns or high turnover) that are likely to attract the attention of retail investors (Barber and Odean 2008) , volatility changes around those events are also consistent with the retail trading explanation.
On the face of it, the interpretation of our new evidence appears to contradict the explanation of the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle put forward by Xu and Malkiel (2003, hereafter XM) and Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003, hereafter BSS) . These two articles argue that the apparent rise in idiosyncratic volatility in their samples is linked to increasing institutional involvement in equity markets. XM support their argument by demonstrating that in a pooled time-series and cross-sectional regression of idiosyncratic volatility on the fraction of institutional ownership and firm size, institutional ownership enters the regression
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To reconcile these two conflicting hypotheses, we reestimate the BSS and XM regressions for different subsamples. When we estimate the regressions for the entire sample, our results are very similar to the evidence in BSS and XM. However, when we estimate the regressions separately for the universe of low-and high-priced stocks, we find that among the low-priced stocks, a higher level of institutional ownership or an increase in institutional ownership predicts lower idiosyncratic volatility. Among the high-priced stocks, which we show are less relevant for the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle, the positive relations found in the previous two articles prevail. The subsample estimates are consistent with our conjecture that retail trading in low-priced stocks is positively associated with the idiosyncratic volatility surge and reversal.
With respect to other recent explanations of the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle, we do not view them as necessarily being inconsistent with our evidence and interpretation. Instead, we emphasize that any credible explanation of the puzzle cannot be based on a unidirectional trend but has to predict episodes that come and go. These other explanations could be consistent with our episodic hypothesis if they can also successfully explain the recent reversal in the idiosyncratic volatility trend.
Our overall conclusion is that low-priced stocks dominated by retail traders played an important role in the rise and the fall in the idiosyncratic volatility levels over the past two decades. The balance of the article proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the data and summarizes the CLMX volatility decomposition methodology used to obtain the time-series patterns. Section 2 presents our new results about idiosyncratic volatility. We discuss our interpretations of the results in Section 3, where we specifically examine the relative roles of retail and institutional investors. In Section 4, we examine how our results relate to existing explanations of the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. Section 5 concludes.
Data and Methodology

Data sources
We obtain the daily as well as monthly split-adjusted stock returns, stock prices, shares outstanding, exchange listing, Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes, and stock split event markers for the universe of all traded New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) firms from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). We restrict the sample to firms with share codes 10 and 11. In addition, we obtain monthly Fama-French factor returns, forty-eight SIC industry classifications, NYSE market capitalization decile breakpoints, and monthly risk-free rates from Kenneth French's data library.
1 Both the daily and the monthly data range from December 1925 to September 2008.
For each listed U.S. firm, we compute leverage and book-to-market ratios using data from Compustat. Book-to-market is the ratio of fiscal year-end book equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes in year t − 1 to market equity in December of year t − 1. Firm size is computed as the market capitalization as of June in year t − 1 and is then used during July of year t − 1 through June of year t. Book leverage is the ratio of book debt to book assets. Market leverage is the ratio of book debt to the sum of book debt and market equity. The annual Compustat data are available for the 1950-2007 period, while the quarterly data are available from 1962 to 2007. Of the 27,877 CRSP stocks, the accounting data are available for 27,109 firms.
In addition to the stock data, we obtain a six-year (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) panel of all trades and positions of a group of retail investors at a large U.S. discount brokerage house.
2 For the 1983-2000 time period, we also obtain retail trading data from the TAQ and the ISSM databases, where small-sized trades are used to proxy for retail trades.
3 Following the recent literature (e.g., Battalio and Mendenhall 2005; Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007; Hvidkjaer 2008; Barber, Odean, and Zhu 2009) , we use the $5,000 trade size cutoff to identify small trades.
4 Like Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009) , we use the ISSM/TAQ data only until 2000 because the assumption that small trades proxy retail trading is less likely to be valid after 2000. In particular, the introduction of decimalized trading in January 2001 and extensive order-splitting by institutions due to reduced trading costs make small trade size a less reliable proxy for retail trading after 2000.
Last, we construct an aggregate measure of institutional ownership for each firm using the 13(f) institutional holdings data from Thomson Reuters. For each firm, over the period from 1980 through 2008Q3, we calculate the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutions.
Idiosyncratic volatility measurement
We follow the volatility decomposition framework developed in CLMX and use daily stock returns to construct the aggregate monthly idiosyncratic volatility time series. First, for each stock j that belongs to industry i, we compute the daily firm-specific residual by subtracting the daily industry-i return:
R ijst is the return on day s in month t of stock j that belongs to industry i and R ist is the value-weighted return of industry i on day s in month t. Next, we obtain the month-t idiosyncratic volatility (IV) of stock j that belongs to industry i as
Using the monthly idiosyncratic volatility estimates for all stocks, we compute the value-weighted average of idiosyncratic volatility for each industry, where market capitalizations at the end of the previous month are used to obtain the weights within the industry. Specifically,
where w ijt is the month-t weight of stock j that belongs to industry i. Last, we compute the value-weighted average of the monthly industry idiosyncratic volatilities to obtain the average idiosyncratic volatility across all firms in a given month. We sum across the forty-eight Fama and French (1997) industries and stocks that are not assigned to any industry are grouped in category 49. Specifically,
where w it is the month-t weight of industry i. For easier interpretation, the monthly average idiosyncratic volatility measures are presented in annualized form. 
Idiosyncratic Volatility Patterns: New Evidence
In this section, we document new results about cross-sectional and time-series variation in idiosyncratic volatility. We initially focus on the new empirical findings and then present our interpretation of the results, as well as how they relate to the existing explanations of the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle, in the next two sections. 5 We follow the notation in CLMX to describe our volatility calculations, but we account for an unequal number of observations within a month. If N is the number of days for which stock returns are available within a month, the idiosyncratic volatility estimate for the month is
To reduce noise, we exclude stocks with fewer than twelve daily observations in a given month but our results are not sensitive to the choice of this arbitrary cutoff. To minimize the effects of outliers, we winsorize the volatility estimates at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. However, our results are qualitatively similar if we do not winsorize. 1926-1930 7.94 15.53 1931-1940 10.22 23.35 1941-1950 5.76 10.40 1951-1960 5.22 7.62 1961-1970 6.57 11.81 1971-1980 7.63 13.79 1981-1990 8.15 16.27 1991-2000 10.10 23.27 2001-2005 8.79 18.60 2006-2008 6.55 12.77 2008 only 9.02 19.89 This table reports the levels of idiosyncratic volatility of all CRSP firms, roughly by decade. It reports both the equal-weighted (EW) and the value-weighted (VW) means of idiosyncratic volatility (annualized standard deviation), measured using daily returns following the CLMX procedure. All entries are monthly averages over a given time period. The 2008 estimates use data only until the end of the third quarter (September). Figure 1 presents time-series plots of aggregate idiosyncratic volatility. The figure shows both the raw (light line) and the 12-month moving average (dark line) of the annualized mean idiosyncratic volatility from January 1926 through September 2008, updating the results of CLMX with the most recent decade of data. The results are also tabulated in Table 1 . We report both the 868 value-weighted and equal-weighted annualized means of the monthly idiosyncratic volatility, grouped roughly by decade. For comparison, in Figure 2 , we show the market volatility time-series computed using the CLMX method. The results in Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1 confirm that the level of idiosyncratic volatility was high and increasing throughout the 1990s, while the market volatility time series did not exhibit such a trend. Over the first part of the CLMX sample (the 1960s and the 1970s), the annualized VW mean idiosyncratic volatility exhibited cyclical variation around an average of about 6%-7% with a few spikes above 10%. Beyond the 1970s, the annualized VW mean idiosyncratic volatility was on average 9%, with a few spikes above 20%. Looking at the 1962-1997 period alone, the latter part of the sample exhibits an increase in the idiosyncratic volatility-the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle first identified in the CLMX study.
Aggregate idiosyncratic volatility levels
Perhaps more surprisingly, the evidence in Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1 indicates that the level of idiosyncratic volatility declined sharply in the past few years. We find that by 2003, the annualized VW mean idiosyncratic volatility declined to a level of 6.59%, which is remarkably close to the average level of idiosyncratic volatility over the first half of the CLMX sample. We therefore conclude that the idiosyncratic volatility appears to have returned to normal levels. The increase in idiosyncratic volatility and then its return to a normal level suggests that the late 1990s' increase in volatility was not a time trend but was caused by an episode of some type of activity that reversed itself. 
Evidence from the 1930s
When we examine a longer historic perspective, we find that a large increase in idiosyncratic volatility followed by a decline back to the historical levels is not a unique event in the U.S. capital market history. A similar volatility episode was observed in the 1930s, where the volatility increased in the late 1920s and then declined, with a local peak in idiosyncratic volatility occurring in 1932. Similar to the recent episode, idiosyncratic volatility peaked shortly after the collapse of the market, and then returned to predepression levels within a few years. Specifically, the VW (EW) average idiosyncratic volatility climbed to more than 26% (54%) shortly after the collapse of the market. But by the mid-1930s, it fell to 6.62% (13.99%), which is very close to the pre-1929 value-weighted and equal-weighted volatility levels of 6.11% and 12.32%, respectively. This historic evidence is consistent with high idiosyncratic volatility being an episodic phenomenon. This is not to say that both volatility episodes were driven by the same mechanism. Our main point is that the data appear to exhibit volatility episodes more so than a trend.
Aggregate idiosyncratic volatility trend estimates
To directly test for the presence of a time trend in the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility time series, and to facilitate comparisons with the previous results, we follow CLMX and use the Vogelsang (1998) trend estimation method. Specifically, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the following time-series model of aggregate volatility on its first lag and a time trend:
IV t is the aggregate month-t idiosyncratic volatility, b 1 is a linear trend coefficient that is the focus of our analysis, and ε t is the error term. To determine whether this trend estimate is significantly positive, we also follow CLMX and use Vogelsang's P S 1 statistic to obtain the 90% confidence interval for the trend estimate.
The trend estimates are presented in panel A of Table 2 . The estimation is carried out separately for the 1962-1997 time period used in the CLMX study and for the extended period covering 1962-2008Q3. To facilitate comparison to the results reported in CLMX, we obtain the trend estimates for the aggregate annualized variance rather than the aggregate annualized standard deviation series.
The trend estimates in CLMX indicate that the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility time series has a statistically significant positive trend 6 The estimates from the most recent time period indicate that both the idiosyncratic volatility and the market volatility levels have started to rise. It is difficult to predict whether this is the beginning of another volatility episode or just a temporary aberration.
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The Idiosyncratic Volatility Puzzle This table reports the idiosyncratic volatility trend estimates (multiplied by 10 5 ) using the Vogelsang (1998) methodology. We use monthly time series for all our estimates. Both panels A and B report estimates for two subperiods. In panel B, we use April 2000 as the breakpoint in the idiosyncratic volatility time series and the trends are estimated for the pre-break and post-break periods. The trend lines are fitted after computing the logarithm of idiosyncratic volatility. The annualized idiosyncratic volatility measure is constructed using the CLMX methodology. To facilitate comparison with the CLMX trend estimates, the estimates are computed using annualized variance series. The small-cap, mid-cap, and large-cap firm size categories are defined using NYSE size deciles 1-3, 4-7, and 8-10, respectively. The three price categories are defined in a similar manner using NYSE price breakpoints. Trend coefficients that are significantly positive (at the 10% level) are indicated in bold.
(= 0.965 × 10 −5 ) during the 1962-1997 sample period. Our trend estimate for this same period is very similar (= 0.963 × 10 −5 ). However, when we extend the sample to 2008Q3, the trend estimate drops to 0.211 × 10 −5 and is no longer significantly positive.
Because the trend estimates depend on the estimation time period, we examine the sensitivity of the trend estimate to the chosen estimation periods. We fix the end period of the estimation window to 1997 or 2008Q3 and vary the starting period between 1926 and 1962 at roughly five-year intervals. The results are reported in Figure A .1 of the Internet Appendix (see the supplementary data online). We find that initially the trend estimate increases as the sample starts earlier. It reaches a peak when the starting point is 1950, and it decreases for earlier starting periods. This pattern is observed for both the 1997 and the 2008 ending periods, though notably, the trends ending in 2008 are much lower and statistically insignificant for all starting points back to 1935. When we start before 1935, the trend becomes statistically insignificant for either ending point. These sensitivity results indicate that irrespective of the starting period, the idiosyncratic volatility trend is considerably weaker and statistically insignificant when we extend the time period to 2008Q3.
Structural breakpoints in the idiosyncratic volatility series
The evidence of a weakening trend suggests that the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility series was an episode that reversed itself, rather than a uniform positive trend. The graphical evidence in Figure 1 shows that the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility peaks in the early 2000s and declines thereafter. In this section, we conduct formal breakpoint tests to identify the locations of structural breaks in the aggregate time series.
We use the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) multiple breakpoints identification method and estimate the following set of m + 1 time-series models of aggregate volatility:
Here, m is the number of breakpoints and t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t m represents the location of those m breakpoints. The form of this time-series model is identical to the model presented in Equation (5). The only difference is that we estimate m + 1 regressions, one for each of the m + 1 segments defined by the m breakpoints. The breakpoint estimation method identifies the location of the breakpoints by minimizing the total residual sum of squares from the m + 1 linear regression models. The key estimate of interest is b j1 , which captures the trend in idiosyncratic volatility.
When we allow for only one breakpoint, the breakpoint in the idiosyncratic volatility time series occurs in April 2000 (see Figure 3) , with a 95% confidence interval spanning January 2000 to September 2000. The trend lines are shown, where the trend lines are fitted after computing the logarithm of idiosyncratic volatility. We use the log transformation to ensure that model-predicted idiosyncratic volatility levels do not become negative. The plot indicates that the trend reverses sign and decreases during the 2001-2008 time period. The positive trend estimate is 1.304 × 10 −5 , the negative trend estimate is −26.629 × 10 −5 , and both estimates are strongly statistically significant.
These breakpoint estimates show formally that the trend in volatility during the 1990s was consistent with an episode that reversed itself. When we allow for multiple breakpoints, the identification method also detects other breakpoints (e.g., August 1975 , March 1994 . We do not pursue the multiple breakpoint analysis further because there is no clear economic rationale for the number of breakpoints and their locations.
Idiosyncratic volatility levels in the cross-section
We now present intriguing new evidence that the idiosyncratic volatility pattern of the 1990s is most evident among small and, more importantly, low-priced stocks. Specifically, we show that, for this subset of stocks, the levels of idiosyncratic volatility are higher and the trend estimates are stronger. 7 Figure 4 shows the idiosyncratic volatility time series for low-priced (bottom three deciles), medium-priced (middle four deciles), and high-priced (top three deciles) stock categories. We follow standard convention and use NYSE breakpoints to sort stocks into price categories. Examining first the high-priced stocks, we notice that during the 1961-2008Q3 period, the rise in idiosyncratic volatility is less pronounced than in the aggregate results. For low-priced stocks, in contrast, the rise and subsequent fall in idiosyncratic volatility is more pronounced. The volatility levels of low-priced stocks are about two to three times higher than the idiosyncratic volatility levels of high-priced stocks.
Since low-priced stocks tend to be small, it is possible that low stock price just proxies for firm size. The level and change in idiosyncratic volatility could somehow even depend mechanically on the level of stock prices. To examine the conditional relation between firm-level idiosyncratic volatility, stock price, and firm size, we estimate a series of Fama-MacBeth monthly and quarterly cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable in these regressions is the 7 Even during the 1930s volatility episode, the idiosyncratic volatility patterns are strongest among the lowestpriced CRSP stocks. This finding is notable because while the late 1920s are notorious for speculative trading in penny stocks, CRSP does not cover these firms, which results in a sample biased toward high-priced firms. Nonetheless, the idiosyncratic volatility pattern is strongest among the low-priced CRSP stocks. firm-level idiosyncratic volatility in month t (computed using daily returns during the month) and the explanatory variables are several firm characteristics, including stock price and firm size, measured at the end of the previous month.
The estimation results are presented in Table 3 . Following Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003), we standardize both the dependent and the independent variables so that the coefficient estimates can be directly compared within and across specifications. We report the average regression coefficients along with t-statistics computed from the standard deviation of the coefficients through time. The standard errors are corrected for potential higher-order serial correlation using the Pontiff (1996) method. 8 In the first monthly specification, where we use the full CRSP sample (1926-2008Q3) , we find that the coefficient estimate for stock price is strongly negative (coefficient estimate = −0.277, t-statistic = −20.38), documenting a link between idiosyncratic volatility and stock price. The coefficient on size is also negative and significant, suggesting that smaller firms are more volatile than larger firms, holding the price constant. However, the magnitude of the coefficient on firm size is significantly lower (coefficient estimate = −0.059, This table reports estimates from Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of annualized idiosyncratic volatility constructed using the CLMX methodology. The independent variables, measured at the end of the previous time period, include: stock price, firm size, lagged idiosyncratic volatility, book-to-market ratio, leverage (the ratio of debt value and total assets or market value), past 12-month stock returns, the level of institutional ownership for the most recent quarter, quarterly change in institutional ownership for the most recent quarter, retail trading proportion (total retail trading volume divided by the market volume), idiosyncratic skewness measured using daily returns, firm age (the number of years since the firm first appears in the CRSP database), and volume turnover. Low Price × High RTP is an interaction dummy that is set to one for stocks with high retail trading proportion (top third) and low prices (bottom third). Low Price × Low RTP is defined in an analogous manner. We use the NYSE price breakpoints to form the high and low price categories. The Pontiff (1996) methodology is used to correct the Fama-MacBeth standard errors for potential serial correlation. The t-values, obtained using corrected standard errors, are reported in parentheses below the estimates. To ensure that extreme values are not affecting the results, we winsorize all variables at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. To allow for direct comparisons among the coefficient estimates within and across specifications, all variables have been standardized so that each variable has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The average number of observations and the average adjusted R 2 are also reported. The sample period varies across the columns and is reported below the column label. The retail trading data are from ISSM/TAQ for the 1983-2000 period, where small-sized trades are used as proxy for retail trades. The 13(f) institutional holdings data are from Thomson Reuters.
t-statistic = −14.89). The estimated price coefficient is about five times the size coefficient.
To facilitate comparisons with previous articles that employ the CRSP sample starting in 1962, we split the sample and estimate the cross-sectional regressions separately for the 1926-1961 (column 2) and 1962-2008Q3 (column 3) time periods. We find that the coefficient estimates on stock price are similar in each of the two periods. But the size coefficient flips sign and becomes mildly positive during the latter time period. These cross-sectional regression estimates indicate that the negative relation between stock price and idiosyncratic volatility is stronger and more robust than the size-volatility relation. We therefore conclude that the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock price does not proxy for a link between idiosyncratic volatility and firm size. 
Conditional idiosyncratic volatility trend estimates
To further understand the stock price-idiosyncratic volatility relation, we examine whether the idiosyncratic volatility trend is concentrated among smaller, low-priced stocks. For this analysis, as before, we follow the Vogelsang (1998) trend estimation methodology. We estimate the time-series trend for different portfolios formed by sorting along stock-price and firm-size dimensions. We use the NYSE size breakpoints to define small-cap, mid-cap, and large-cap stocks. The three price categories are defined in an analogous manner using NYSE price breakpoints. As before, to facilitate direct comparisons with the CLMX study, we calculate the trend estimates using the annualized variance time series.
The conditional volatility trend estimates are reported in Table 2 , panel A, where the estimation is carried out separately for the 1962-1997 and 1962-2008Q3 periods. We find that trends are stronger for small and low-priced firms and insignificant for the high-priced and large-firm-size categories.
10
For instance, during the 1962-1997 period, the trend estimate for high-priced and large-cap firms are 0.256 and 0.433, respectively, and both estimates are insignificant. In comparison, the trend estimates for low-priced and small-cap firms are 1.688 and 1.739, and both estimates are significant. Importantly, we find that, in comparison to firm size, the stock price level has a stronger influence on the volatility trend. Even among the large-cap firms, the trend is significantly positive (1.771) when the stock price is low.
When we extend the time period to 2008, the trend estimates become significantly weaker. The only significant remaining trend is among small and low-priced stocks. Again, consistent with our cross-sectional results, the trend 9 For robustness, we estimate a regression specification that contains shares outstanding rather than firm size as one of the independent variables. The results reported in Table A .1 of the Internet Appendix (see columns 1 and 2) (see the supplementary data online) indicate that the results are qualitatively similar.
10 CLMX also report that the volatility trend is stronger among smaller firms but they do not examine the relative roles of stock price and firm size.
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The estimates indicate that stock price is more important than firm size as a determinant of the idiosyncratic volatility patterns. These subperiod and subsample trend estimates indicate that the idiosyncratic volatility time series contains distinct rising and falling segments. To examine whether the rising and falling patterns are stronger among certain types of stocks, we obtain the trend estimates for price-and size-sorted portfolios separately for the pre-and post-break periods. Given our evidence in Section 2.4, we use April 2000 as the series breakpoint. The subperiod estimates are reported in Table 2 , panel B. The trend lines for price-and size-sorted portfolios are also plotted in Figure 6 . As expected, the volatility trends are significantly positive during the pre-break period and strongly negative during the post-break period. More importantly, we find that the magnitudes of the trend estimates during both pre-and post-break periods are stronger for lower-priced firms and smaller firms.
For additional robustness, we examine the idiosyncratic volatility patterns separately for NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX stocks. We expect the idiosyncratic volatility patterns to be weaker among relatively larger and higher-priced NYSE/AMEX stocks. Consistent with our evidence for low-priced stocks, we find that the idiosyncratic volatility level is lower for NYSE/AMEX stocks (see Figure 5 ). Furthermore, for both the 1962-1997 and 1962-2008Q3 periods, the trend estimates are small (0.032 and −0.024, respectively) and statistically indistinguishable from zero for NYSE/AMEX stocks. 
Figure 6
Trend lines for price-and size-sorted portfolios with one structural breakpoint This figure shows the two trend lines for price-and size-sorted portfolios. The small-cap, mid-cap, and large-cap firm size categories are defined using NYSE size deciles 1-3, 4-7, and 8-10, respectively. The three price categories are defined in a similar manner using NYSE price breakpoints. Other details of the plot are the same as in Figure 3 . Rows and columns are defined as in Table 2 .
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Overall, our new results on idiosyncratic volatility patterns indicate that the high levels of idiosyncratic volatility in the 1990s are not evidence of a trend, but rather are an episodic phenomenon.
11 One of the main features of high idiosyncratic volatility episodes is that the phenomenon is concentrated in lowpriced stocks. The obvious question is: What is special about low-priced stocks, and how does this observation help us learn about the mechanisms that might generate idiosyncratic volatility episodes? In the next section, we attempt to answer these questions and interpret the empirical evidence presented so far.
Explaining Episodic Idiosyncratic Volatility Patterns
Main hypothesis
Low-priced stocks are special for a number of reasons. First, low-priced stocks are usually not eligible to be bought on margin (Han 1995) . Second, many institutions shy away from holding low-priced stocks for prudence reasons (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1992; Del Guercio 1996; Brav and Heaton 1997) . They may also simply avoid trading low-priced stocks due to illiquidity and high transaction costs. In contrast, retail investors might find lower-priced stocks attractive for several reasons. For example, retail speculators might be attracted by the gambling-like skewness inherent in the returns of lowpriced stocks.
12 Furthermore, the scarcity of institutional investors in lowpriced stocks, viewed as having access to superior information, can lead to a more level playing field for retail investors.
Whatever the reasons, if retail investors find low-priced stocks attractive and dominate the trading in those stocks, retail investors could influence the returns and volatility patterns of low-priced stocks. Therefore, we conjecture a link between low stock prices, trading by retail investors, and episodes of idiosyncratic volatility. 13 Analogous to previous attempts to explain the apparent time trend in idiosyncratic volatility with other trending variables, such as institutional ownership, firm age, or accounting data quality, it is difficult, if not impossible, to directly prove or disprove our conjecture based on 11 Idiosyncratic volatility increased appreciably toward the end of 2008 and into 2009, after our sample period ended. This behavior is consistent with idiosyncratic volatility trending for a time before eventually reversing, as we model empirically in Table 2 . We look forward to future research that extends this modeling effort to account for the recent increase in volatility.
12 Kumar (2009) finds that retail investors significantly overweight low-priced stocks in their portfolios, relative to expected stock holdings if investors were to randomly choose portfolios according to market capitalization weights. The overweighting by retail investors in low-priced stocks is particularly evident among stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility and high idiosyncratic skewness. This preference could reflect overweighting of the low probabilities of extreme returns (Barberis and Huang 2008) or reflect that low-priced, high-volatility stocks offer better opportunities for experiencing higher levels of utility realizations (Barberis and Xiong 2009).
13 CLMX also conjecture (but do not test) that day trading might influence idiosyncratic volatility. Our conjecture applies to the entire population of retail investors and we try to identify the channels through which retail trading might influence idiosyncratic volatility. To the extent that our retail trading measure proxies for day trading, our evidence is consistent with the CLMX conjecture.
essentially one episode. 14 Nonetheless, we present several pieces of evidence from cross-sectional tests that are consistent with retail trading being an important determinant of idiosyncratic volatility patterns.
Retail trading and idiosyncratic volatility
In the first set of tests, we directly examine whether retail trading is an important determinant of the observed idiosyncratic volatility patterns. Using small-trades data from ISSM and TAQ, for each month we compute the proportion of total trading volume that can be attributed to retail investors. Specifically, the retail investors' trading intensity or retail trading proportion (RTP) for a given stock in a certain month is defined as the total retail trading volume (sum of buy-and sell-initiated small trades) divided by the total trading volume in the market. We define low, medium, and high retail trading stocks as those that are in the bottom three, middle four, and top three deciles of monthly retail trading proportion, respectively.
In Table 3 , column 5, we report the estimates from Fama-MacBeth crosssectional regressions with retail trading measures as additional explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the month-t idiosyncratic volatility of a certain stock. The results indicate that the coefficient estimate of stock price becomes weaker (compare columns 4 and 5) when we introduce additional variables in the regression specification, including RTP. We also find that RTP has a significantly positive coefficient estimate (coefficient estimate = 0.052, t-statistic = 4.75), which indicates that the degree of retail trading has an incremental effect on the level of idiosyncratic volatility. The relation between RTP and idiosyncratic volatility is stronger than that between institutional ownership level and change in institutional ownership, but weaker than the relation between stock price and idiosyncratic volatility.
To better understand the relation between high retail trading levels and low stock price levels and their effect on idiosyncratic volatility patterns among low-priced stocks, we introduce two interaction terms in the regression specification. We find that when the stock price and RTP are low, there is no incremental influence of stock price level on idiosyncratic volatility levels. The Low Stock Price × Low RTP interaction term has an insignificant coefficient estimate (coefficient estimate = −0.001, t-statistic = −0.60). Only when the retail trading levels are high do stocks with low prices have higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility. The Low Stock Price × High RTP interaction term has a significant coefficient estimate (coefficient estimate = 0.037, t-statistic = 3.34). In untabulated results, we find that even for high-priced stocks, stocks with high RTP have moderately higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility (coefficient estimate = 0.016, t-statistic = 3.25).
14 We do not have retail-trading data for the 1920s, and even for the recent episode, the retail-trading proxy from ISSM/TAQ is available only from 1983 to 2000. The ISSM/TAQ data are available beyond 2000, but, as discussed in Section 1.1, it is problematic to use small trades to proxy for retail trading beyond 2000. See Hvidkjaer (2008) and Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009) Overall, the estimates from extended regression specifications indicate that the idiosyncratic volatility patterns are significantly stronger for stocks with high retail trading. In particular, the RTP-price interaction coefficient estimates indicate that RTP influences idiosyncratic volatility levels in the extremes.
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Even after controlling for RTP, price remains a strong predictor of idiosyncratic volatility, perhaps because RTP is an imperfect measure of retail trading.
Retail trading and low-priced stocks
In our next set of tests, we attempt to establish a more direct link between low stock prices and speculative trading by retail investors. We start by examining the holdings and trades of both retail and institutional investors. We analyze data from three different sources. We consider the quarterly institutional holdings data from 1980 to 2007, the discount brokerage data from 1991 to 1996, and the small-trades data from ISSM/TAQ from 1983 to 2000.
We perform one-dimensional price sorts and examine whether average institutional holdings are lower among low-priced stocks. In panel A of Table 4 , we summarize by decade the average level of institutional ownership for firms with different price levels. The table reports the mean fraction of shares owned by institutions, as identified by 13(f) filings. For each price category, we also report the fraction of firms with less than 10% institutional ownership ("Low" institutional ownership column).
Two patterns emerge. First, over time, consistent with the evidence in Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) , there is a strong trend toward greater institutional ownership. More interesting from our perspective, we find that in each of the three decades, the level of institutional ownership is considerably lower for low-priced stocks (price deciles 1-3) than for high-priced stocks (price deciles 8-10). Toward the beginning of the institutional sample, about 83% of low-priced firms have less than 10% institutional ownership (as shown in the "Low" column) and the average ownership level is only 5.25%. Even during more recent years, about 44% of low-priced firms have less than 10% institutional ownership and the average ownership level is 21.44%. In contrast, the average level of institutional ownership of high-priced stocks is 56.44% and only about 8% of those stocks have institutional ownership below 10%. These results indicate that the ownership of low-(high-) priced stocks is relatively dominated by retail (institutional) investors.
We next examine retail trades using the small-trades data from ISSM/TAQ. We find that the RTP is stronger among stocks that have low market capitalizations, low prices, low institutional ownerships, and high idiosyncratic volatility (see panel B of Table 4 ). Specifically, stocks with retail trading proportion in the top three deciles typically have stock price below $10, institutional ownership 15 We also estimated a "change" regression, where change in idiosyncratic volatility is the dependent variable and change in RTP and stock price level are the main independent variables. We find a strong positive relation between change in idiosyncratic volatility and change in RTP (estimate = 0.140, t-statistic = 11.85). In addition, we find a strong negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock price (estimate = −0.341, t-statistic = −8.32). This table reports several stock preference measures for both institutional investors and retail investors. For each decade (approximately), panel A shows the mean fraction of shares held by institutions (the "Avg" column) and the fraction of firms with less than 10% institutional ownership (the "Low" column). The stock price (low or deciles 1-3, medium or deciles 4-7, and high or deciles 8-10) is used as the conditioning variable. In panel B, we report the mean characteristics (idiosyncratic volatility measured using the CLMX methodology, firm size, stock price, institutional ownership, market volume turnover, and the book-to-market ratio) of stocks, conditional on the degree of retail trading. The retail trading proportion (RTP) is defined as the ratio of the total volume of buyand sell-initiated small trades to total market trading volume. In panel C, we report the mean percentage over (under) weight in retail ownership for firms sorted on firm size and price. To construct this panel, we compute a "benchmark" percentage ownership based on the total market capitalization of stocks that fall into each quintile portfolio at the end of each month. We then compute an "actual" percentage retail ownership based on the total market capitalization of stocks actually owned by the retail investors in our sample. Panel values represent the difference between these two percentages, averaged across all months in our sample period. In panel A, the 13(f) institutional holdings data for the January 1980 to September 2008 period are from Thomson Reuters. In panel B, we use the ISSM/TAQ small trades data for the 1983-2000 time period, where small-sized trades are used as proxy for retail trades. The retail investor data used in panel C are from a large U.S. discount brokerage house for the period 1991-1996. below 10%, and market capitalization under $100 million. The ISSM/TAQ evidence indicates that retail investors dominate the trading in low-priced stocks. A similar profile of retail investors emerges when we directly examine the stock holdings and trading patterns of retail investors. Specifically, we consider the aggregate portfolio holdings of retail investors at a large U.S. discount brokerage house and examine the under-and overweighting of stocks (relative to their weights in the aggregate market portfolio) with certain characteristics. The results indicate that retail investors overweight low-priced stocks by more than 14% and underweight high-priced stocks by more than 22% (see Table 4 , panel C). They also overweight smaller stocks (by 9.62%), but the degree of overweighting is less than their excess weight in lower-priced stocks. 16 To examine retail investors' trading behavior in a multivariate setting, we estimate monthly Fama-MacBeth-type cross-sectional regressions, where a stock's RTP in a given month is the dependent variable. A variety of stock characteristics, including stock price, volatility, skewness, institutional ownership, and change in institutional ownership, are included as independent variables. All independent variables are measured at the end of the previous month. The results are reported in Table 5 (columns 1-3). 17 We find that retail investors are more dominant (RTP is higher) among lower-priced stocks, and higher idiosyncratic volatility stocks, even when we control for other known determinants of retail trading, including firm size. Furthermore, RTP is higher among stocks with higher skewness and the low price-high skewness interaction dummy has a positive coefficient estimate. As expected, we also find that retail trading is lower among stocks with higher institutional ownership.
Taken together, the RTP cross-sectional regression results indicate that retail investors hold a greater proportion of low-priced stocks and trade these stocks actively. If retail (institutional) investors have a strong preference (aversion) for low-priced stocks, it seems plausible that the strong idiosyncratic volatility patterns in low-priced stocks could be attributed to the trading activities of retail investors.
Shifts in ownership, trading, and idiosyncratic volatility
In our third set of empirical tests, we directly examine the link between the retail trading intensity, institutional ownership changes, and idiosyncratic volatility levels.
Measuring institutional ownership as the fraction of shares held by institutions, Xu and Malkiel (2003) show that in regressions of firm-level idiosyncratic volatility on the level of institutional ownership and firm size, institutional ownership enters with a statistically significant positive sign. Similarly, Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) show that change in percentage institutional holdings during a given quarter is positively related to the level of idiosyncratic volatility in the following quarter, even after controlling for the effects of other stock characteristics, including the level of idiosyncratic volatility in the current This table reports the Fama-MacBeth-type cross-sectional regression estimates to explain the proportion of retail trading in a stock in a given time period. The dependent variable in all specifications is the retail trading proportion (RTP) for a given stock i in month t. The independent variables include the following stock characteristics: stock price, firm size, idiosyncratic volatility measured using the CLMX methodology, idiosyncratic skewness (the skewness of the residual from a time-series regression with excess market returns and squared excess market returns as the explanatory variables), past 12-month stock return, volume turnover (the ratio of the number of shares traded and the number of shares outstanding), market beta, book-to-market ratio, level of institutional ownership, quarterly change in institutional ownership, and an overconfidence proxy, which is defined as the 252-day post-trade sell-buy return differential (PTSBD). All independent variables are measured at the end of month t − 1. The institutional ownership data are quarterly and, thus, ownership data from the most recent quarter are used in month t. Stocks with fewer than five buy and sell trades are not included in the analysis. The Pontiff (1996) method is used to correct the Fama-MacBeth standard errors for potential higher-order serial correlation. quarter. Taken together, these two pieces of evidence seem to suggest that higher institutional ownership is associated with higher idiosyncratic volatility. At first glance, the evidence from Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) and Xu and Malkiel (2003) seems to contradict our claim that low-priced stocks, which are generally not held by institutions, are associated with episodic increases in idiosyncratic volatility. To better understand how our results relate to these two articles, we follow the estimation methodology and the regression specifications in Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) and Xu and Malkiel (2003) , and estimate Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable in these regressions is the logarithm of idiosyncratic volatility in quarter t, and the set of independent variables are those defined in Table 3 . The estimation is carried out for the full sample and also separately for firms with high (top three deciles) and low (bottom three deciles) share prices. As before, we use NYSE breakpoints to define low-and high-priced stock categories. All variables are standardized and the standard errors are corrected for potential higher-order serial correlation using the Pontiff (1996) method.
The results are presented in Table 6 , where, for brevity, we present the estimates for only the main variables. In column 1, where we consider all firms, the institutional ownership variable has a positive estimate. This estimate becomes stronger when we reestimate the model for only the high-priced stocks (see column 2). These estimates are consistent with Xu and Malkiel's (2003) findings, and confirm that, for high-priced stocks, a higher level of institutional ownership is associated with higher idiosyncratic volatility.
Similarly, for the full sample (column 4) and for the high-priced stocks sample (column 5), the results from quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions indicate that change in institutional ownership during a certain quarter is positively associated with the level of idiosyncratic volatility in the following quarter.
18 For the full sample and high-priced stocks subsample, the coefficient estimates for the "change in institutional ownership" variable are 0.022 (t-statistic = 4.86) and 0.042 (t-statistic = 4.28), respectively. This evidence is consistent with the findings in Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) and confirms that, for high-priced stocks, an increase in institutional ownership is associated with higher future idiosyncratic volatility.
When we focus on the subsample of low-priced stocks (columns 3 and 6), the results are strikingly different in one key dimension. The sign of the slope coefficients on institutional ownership and change in institutional ownership are flipped. The negative and statistically significant coefficient estimates indicate that for the universe of low-priced stocks, a lower level of institutional ownership and a smaller change in institutional ownership are associated with higher idiosyncratic volatility. The table provides Fama-MacBeth-type point estimates and t-statistics from cross-sectional regressions for price-based subsamples. The sample period is from 1983 to 2000. The dependent variable is the logarithm of annualized idiosyncratic volatility constructed using the CLMX methodology. The independent variables, measured at the end of the previous time period, include: stock price, firm size, lagged idiosyncratic volatility, market beta, standard deviation of returns, past 12-month stock returns, the level of institutional ownership for the most recent quarter, quarterly change in institutional ownership for the most recent quarter, retail trading proportion (total retail trading volume divided by the market volume), firm age (the number of years since the firm first appears in the CRSP database), volume turnover, and dividend yield. The sample period is from January 1983 to December 2000. The full sample is used in columns 1, 4, and 7; the high-priced subsample is used in columns 2, 5, and 8; low-priced subsample is used in columns 3, 6, and 9. We use the NYSE price breakpoints to form the high and low price categories. The Pontiff (1996) method is used to correct the Fama-MacBeth standard errors for potential serial correlation in the coefficient estimates. The t-values, obtained using corrected standard errors, are reported in parentheses below the estimates. To ensure that extreme values are not affecting the results, we winsorize all variables at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. To allow for direct comparisons among the coefficient estimates, the independent variables have been standardized so that each variable has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The average number of observations and the average adjusted R 2 are also reported. The retail trading data for the 1983-2000 period are from ISSM/TAQ, where small-sized trades are used as a proxy for retail trades. The 13(f) institutional holdings data are from Thomson Reuters. Last, to examine the relative roles of retail and institutional investors in generating the idiosyncratic volatility patterns, we estimate the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions with a retail trading measure (i.e., RTP) and the two institutional measures. These estimates for the full sample, high-priced stocks subsample and low-priced stocks subsample are reported in Table 6 , columns 7-9, respectively. We find that RTP has a strong positive coefficient estimate in the low-priced stocks sample (column 9). In contrast, the two institutional ownership measures continue to have significantly negative coefficient estimates. We also find that the coefficient estimates for institutional ownership and retail trading are very similar when we consider a slightly different specification shown in column 6 of Table 3 .
Given that the low-priced and high-priced samples yield opposite results, the remaining question is, which results matter more for explaining the episodic spikes in idiosyncratic volatility. We believe that the low-priced stocks subsample, where we demonstrated a positive (negative) relation between retail (institutional) ownership and idiosyncratic volatility, is more relevant for understanding idiosyncratic volatility. This regression is more relevant in our opinion because we have already shown that episodic increases in idiosyncratic volatility are concentrated in low-priced stocks (see, for example, Table 2 ). The fact that high levels of institutional ownership and a greater increase in institutional ownership are associated with higher idiosyncratic volatility in high-priced stocks is certainly interesting. However, we believe that this evidence is not directly relevant to the episodic idiosyncratic volatility pattern in hand.
Granger causality tests
Our evidence thus far demonstrates that retail trading and idiosyncratic volatility levels are positively related, but the direction of causality is unclear. We now examine the lead-lag relation between retail trading and idiosyncratic volatility using a bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) framework. Table 7 presents the VAR estimates (panels A and B) and Granger causality probabilities (panel C). We consider both value-weighted and equal-weighted time series of average idiosyncratic volatility and retail trading. We find that both RTP and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) series are very persistent. For example, when we examine the value-weighted series, the lagged RTP and lagged IVOL have coefficient estimates of 0.741 (t-statistic = 13.54) and 0.555 (t-statistic = 10.47), respectively. More importantly, we find that lagged RTP can predict the current levels of IVOL, while lagged IVOL is a weak (and statistically insignificant) predictor of current RTP. The results obtained using equal-weighted and value-weighted series are qualitatively similar. Overall, we do not find evidence that idiosyncratic volatility "causes" retail trading.
Stock splits and attention-grabbing events
Our next piece of evidence linking retail trading and idiosyncratic volatility comes from analyzing changes in retail trading behavior, changes in 
where RTP t is the average retail trading proportion in month t and I V O L t is the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility in month t. The retail trading proportion is defined as the ratio of the total retail trading volume (measured in dollar terms) and the total market trading volume. Idiosyncratic volatility is measured using daily returns following the CLMX volatility decomposition methodology. In panels A and B, the VAR estimates for value-weighted and equal-weighted series, respectively, are reported and the t-statistics for the coefficient estimates are shown in parentheses below the estimates. In panel C, the probability matrices from Granger causality tests are shown, where a matrix element represents the impact of column variable on the row variable. The retail trading data for the 1983-2000 period are from ISSM/TAQ, where small-sized trades are used as a proxy for retail trades.
institutional holdings, and changes in idiosyncratic volatility around certain salient events. This investigation is motivated by the belief that event studies allow us to better capture the relation between retail trading and idiosyncratic volatility. We consider two types of events: (i) regular stock splits; and (ii) attention-grabbing extreme return and turnover events. We analyze the events in two ways that are related to our conjecture. First, we determine whether a firm's idiosyncratic volatility changes around salient events are related to changes in retail trading activities. Second, we investigate whether trading activities around these events change in a way that indicates a retail preference for low-priced stocks.
To examine the relation between price changes and volatility changes around stock splits, we estimate a regression model. For each split event, we calculate the difference between average annualized idiosyncratic volatility in the six months subsequent to the month of the split (post-event window) and average annualized idiosyncratic volatility over the six months prior to the month of the split (pre-event window). To control for the observed trend in the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility time series, we subtract the aggregate change in idiosyncratic volatility from the actual change in idiosyncratic volatility around the split event. We use this aggregate-trend-adjusted change in idiosyncratic volatility as the main dependent variable. The key explanatory variables are change in the average stock price around the split event, the split factor, change in retail trading proportion around the event, change in institutional ownership around the event, and an interaction dummy that is set to one for stocks with a large (top third) change in RTP and a large (top third in absolute value) price drop. The retail trading proportion measure is computed using both the ISSM/TAQ and the brokerage samples.
We also include the following control variables in the regression specification: past 12-month stock return, a dividend-paying dummy, the book-to-market ratio, volume turnover measured in the pre-event window to account for liquidity, and firm size in the month prior to the event to control for various size-related effects. The past return variable serves as a control for the known effects of past returns on the trading behavior of retail investors (Barber and Odean 2008) . For instance, investors' trading activities might be influenced by their contrarian tendencies, trend-following behavior, or because they exhibit the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman 1984; Odean 1998a) . 19 We include a dividend-paying dummy and the book-to-market ratio as additional control variables to ensure that the results do not simply reflect the known relation between future growth opportunities and idiosyncratic volatility (Xu and Malkiel 2003; Cao, Simin, and Zhao 2008) .
We estimate different specifications of the model and consider different sample periods, depending upon the availability of data. During the full sample period , there are a total of 16,741 regular stock split events (CRSP distribution code = 5523). During the 1983-2000 and 1991-1996 periods, there are 9,737 and 2,925 split events, respectively.
The regression results for stock splits are presented in Table 8 , panel A. In the first specification, we examine splits during the full sample period and consider only the price change around the split event and split factor as independent variables. We find that idiosyncratic volatility increases as stock price falls and we observe the same pattern when we consider splits during the 1983-2000 time period (see column 2). These results are consistent with our earlier findings, which indicate that low prices are associated with higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility. Because retail trading intensity is higher among low-priced stocks, this evidence also implies that higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility are associated with higher levels of retail trading. Next, we examine the link between retail trading and idiosyncratic volatility directly using an extended split regression specification. We introduce two retail trading measures in the specification: (i) change in the RTP measure; and (ii) an interaction term defined using RTP. We also include the change in institutional ownership and other control variables. In column 3 of Table 8 , we measure RTP using the ISSM/TAQ data, while in column 4, RTP is obtained using investors' trades in the brokerage data.
We find that the coefficient estimates of price change and split factor variables in the extended specification are only slightly different from those in the first specification. More importantly, we find that both retail trading measures are positively associated with the change in idiosyncratic volatility, while the change in institutional ownership variable has a negative coefficient estimate. The coefficient estimates are very similar (and somewhat stronger) when we use the brokerage data to measure changes in the degree of retail trading and consider a shorter sample period from 1991 to 1996. 20 20 The results are similar when we use buy-sell imbalance (BSI) measures of retail trading using dollar value of trades or number of trades instead of the RTP measure. The dollar volume-based BSI for a given stock in a particular month is defined as the ratio of the excess buy volume (total buy volume − total sell volume) to the 890 This table reports the regression estimates for stock splits (panel A) and other "attention-grabbing" events (panel B). Attention-grabbing events are defined as the extreme (at least three standard deviations above the mean) positive return events (RetPos), extreme negative (at least 1.5 standard deviations below the mean) return events (RetNeg), and extreme (at least three standard deviations above the mean) turnover events (Turn). In panel A, in columns 1-4, the dependent variable is the change in idiosyncratic volatility around the split event, where both the pre-split and post-split periods are six months long. In specifications (4) and (5), the dependent variable is the change in retail trading proportion around the split event, measured using ISSM/TAQ and brokerage data, respectively. In specification (6), the dependent variable is the change in institutional ownership around the split event. The sample period varies across the columns and is reported below the column label. In panel B, the dependent variable is the change in idiosyncratic volatility around attention-grabbing events in all specifications. The sample period is from 1983 to 2000. In columns 1 and 2, we consider extreme positive return events; in columns 3 and 4, we consider extreme negative return events; and in columns 5 and 6, we consider extreme turnover events. The independent variables are: (i) change in average stock price between pre-split and post-split periods; (ii) split factor, which measures the split intensity; and (iii) change in average retail trading proportion (RTP) between pre-split and post-split periods, measured using either small trades data from ISSM/TAQ or actual retail trades from a large U.S. brokerage house. The retail trading proportion is defined as the ratio of the total retail trading volume (measured in dollar terms) and the total market trading volume. For the ISSM/TAQ sample, retail trades are proxied using small trades. For regular stock splits, positive return events, and high turnover events, the Large RTP × Large Price Drop is the interaction dummy that is set to one for stocks with high RTP (top third) and large price drop (bottom third). We use the past 12-month return to control for the effects of past returns on retail trading, including the disposition effect. Other independent variables include the mean volume turnover measured in the pre-event window, firm age, a dividend-paying dummy that is set to one if the stock pays a dividend in the past one year, and the book-to-market ratio. The ISSM/TAQ data are available for the 1983-2000 time period and the brokerage data are available for the 1991-1996 time period. Robust standard errors are used to compute the t-statistics. The t-values, obtained using corrected standard errors, are reported in parentheses below the estimates. The retail trading data for the 1983-2000 period are from ISSM/TAQ, where small-sized trades are used as a proxy for retail trades. The 13(f) institutional holdings data are from Thomson Reuters.
The control variables have the expected signs. For example, the change in idiosyncratic volatility is higher for stocks that have performed poorly in the past, are smaller in size, have lower liquidity, and do not pay dividends. The negative coefficient estimate for the dividend-paying dummy is consistent with the results in Xu and Malkiel (2003) , who show that idiosyncratic volatility is positively associated with future growth opportunities. Overall, the evidence from split regressions indicates that the split-induced price decline coupled with an increased degree of retail trading and reduction in institutional ownership is associated with higher idiosyncratic volatility levels following stock splits.
Among the independent variables, the price change variable has the strongest coefficient estimate. To examine whether the large coefficient estimate on price change variable is related to changes in RTP or changes in institutional ownership, we estimate three additional regressions in columns 5, 6, and 7. In these regressions, the dependent variable is the change in RTP or change in institutional ownership around the event. We find that price change has a strong negative coefficient estimate in the change in RTP regressions (columns 5 and 6), which indicates that retail trading intensity increases following split-induced price drops. In contrast, institutional ownership decreases following stock splits (column 7).
We next investigate whether the relation between retail trading and idiosyncratic volatility generalizes to corporate events other than stock splits. This analysis is motivated by the findings in Lee (1992) and Barber and Odean (2008) , who show that, irrespective of news content, retail trading intensity increases around attention-grabbing events.
21 Specifically, we follow Barber and Odean (2008) and identify return-and turnover-based events that are likely to catch the attention of retail investors. We define attention-grabbing events as days on which the return is either at least three standard deviations higher or 1.5 standard deviations lower than the mean daily return of the stock. 22 In addition, we identify days with daily turnover greater than three standard deviations from the mean turnover level. The regression estimates for these events defined over the 1983-2000 period are presented in Table 8 , panel B.
The estimates for positive and negative return-and turnover-based events are remarkably similar to the split events. In all three instances, there is an increase in idiosyncratic volatility when stock price drops, along with an increase in retail trading that is associated with an increase in idiosyncratic volatility. As expected, the effects are stronger for events that are associated with larger total trading volume. Number of trade-based BSI is defined in a similar manner. For example, in specification (3) of Table 8 , when we use BSI as an independent variable instead of RTP, it has a coefficient estimate of 0.046 (t-statistic = 3.86). This evidence indicates that an increase in retail trading activities around stock splits is associated with higher levels of buying. 21 Also, see Graham and Kumar (2006) . Consistent with the attention hypothesis, they show that older and lowincome investors purchase stocks that recently announced dividends. 22 We use different cutoffs for defining positive and negative return events to get a sufficient number of positive as well as negative events. Our results are robust to different cutoffs used to define positive and negative events.
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http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from changes in RTP and stock price. The interaction term has a large absolute coefficient estimate in all three cases. Collectively, the evidence from these event studies provides a link between retail trading and idiosyncratic volatility. The split regressions indicate that when a stock splits and its price falls, its idiosyncratic volatility typically increases. Furthermore, we find that an increase in retail trading is associated with greater volatility around split events. These results are similar to the cross-sectional regression estimates for low-priced stocks in Table 6 and are consistent with the conjecture that retail trading is related to volatility in returns.
Investor overconfidence and idiosyncratic volatility
Our analysis so far is consistent with attention and trading by retail investors being related to idiosyncratic volatility in returns. In our last test, we consider an additional channel through which retail trading could influence idiosyncratic volatility, namely, investor overconfidence. Gervais and Odean (2001) argue that due to biased self-attribution, investors might become more overconfident when markets rise. Moreover, Odean (1998b) shows that overconfident investors can induce greater idiosyncratic volatility in stock returns. Thus, the increasing idiosyncratic volatility in rising markets might reflect investor overconfidence.
The positive relation between monthly volume turnover and idiosyncratic volatility shown earlier (see Table 3 , column 6) is consistent with the overconfidence hypothesis. To more directly examine the potential link between overconfidence and idiosyncratic volatility, we use the brokerage sample to define a proxy for investor overconfidence. The proxy we use is based on the assumption that overconfident investors make larger investment mistakes. Investors might be overconfident about the quality of their private information or they could overestimate their ability to process private information. In either case, an overconfident investor is likely to make systematic errors when she formulates her trading decisions. Consequently, the stocks she sells are likely to systematically outperform the stocks she purchases by a significant margin.
With this motivation, and following Odean (1999) , we use the k-day posttrade sell-buy return differential (PTSBD) as a proxy for investor overconfidence. We use the trades of all sample investors in stock i in month t to compute the PTBSD of the stock in month t. A large positive value of PTSBD for a stock indicates that investors holding the stock systematically make mistakes, where they either systematically misinterpret their private information or overestimate their abilities. In contrast, if an investor does not exhibit overconfidence and simply trades in a random fashion, the stocks she sells will perform similarly to the stocks she purchases. Consequently, the PTSBD would be close to zero. 23 We estimate a regression model, in which the month-t stock-level RTP is the dependent variable and the monthly stock-level overconfidence proxy along with other determinants of RTP identified earlier serve as independent variables. All independent variables are measured in month t − 1. The estimation results are presented as column 4 in Table 5 . We find that RTP is positively associated with the overconfidence proxy (coefficient estimate = 0.082, t-stat = 5.43), even after accounting for the known determinants of RTP. Thus, RTP levels are higher among stocks where investors make ex post worse trading decisions, perhaps due to their overconfidence. This evidence is consistent with RTP possibly influencing idiosyncratic volatility at least partially through the overconfidence channel.
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Our analysis does not fully explain what drives retail preferences and trading activities. We demonstrate that stock characteristics and proxies for behavioral factors are associated with the level of retail trading. However, lacking an instrument for retail trading, our results should be interpreted as identifying an association rather than causality. We leave for future research the modeling of retail trading that would identify the causal mechanisms. 25 For example, other factors such as innovations in macroeconomic variables could influence RTP.
Alternative Explanations
In the last section of the article, we entertain four alternative explanations for the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle and examine how those explanations relate to our findings.
Firm valuation, financial distress, and idiosyncratic volatility
In the first test, we examine whether higher idiosyncratic volatility levels are associated with higher market valuations, which might be related to speculative euphoria induced by retail investors. Specifically, we examine the relation between firm-level idiosyncratic volatility and firm valuation, as measured by book-to-market (B/M) ratios. Our hypothesis is that companies with high market valuations relative to book values, a possible sign of high growth opportunities that might cause speculative exuberance about the firm or its industry, have higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility.
This hypothesis is opposite to the key implication from the Merton (1974) model, in which equity claims are interpreted as a call option on the value of the firm, with the strike price being the point beyond which the firm cannot repay its debt. In Merton's model, as the value of the firm falls relative to its debt obligations and the financial distress rises, stock price falls and the volatility of equity claims increases. Thus, leverage has an explicit role in Merton's model and the B/M ratio is a measure of how far the firm is from default. This 24 Our results are based on k = 252, but the results are very similar when we choose other values of k, such as 126 (six months) or 63 (three months). For example, when k = 126, the Overconfidence Proxy has a coefficient estimate of 0.077 (t-statistic = 2.93). 25 In a recent study, Foucault, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009) use an instrumental variable approach to examine the causal relation between retail trading and volatility and find evidence consistent with our main hypothesis.
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http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from model predicts that the B/M ratio would be positively related to idiosyncratic volatility and, moreover, it should statistically diminish the significance of the stock price effect. To examine the Merton model explanation for the level of idiosyncratic volatility, we include the leverage ratio and the book-to-market ratio as additional variables explaining firm-specific volatility. We also include the stock return over the past year as an additional proxy for financial distress.
The regression results in Table 3 , column 5, indicate that neither prediction of the Merton (1974) model is borne out in the regression results. We find that idiosyncratic volatility decreases with the B/M ratio. After controlling for stock price and firm size, the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and the B/M ratio is negative and statistically significant. This result is inconsistent with the Merton model implication regarding distress.
Like the B/M ratio, leverage enters the regression with a sign opposite to that predicted by the model (i.e., firms with higher leverage appear to have lower idiosyncratic volatility). Lagged return enters the regression with the appropriate sign. A negative return is associated with higher idiosyncratic volatility, but the estimate is statistically weak. We conclude from these regression estimates that the negative relation between stock price and idiosyncratic volatility is unlikely to be induced by financial distress. Rather, the evidence is consistent with trading among low-priced and low B/M stocks, perhaps on the part of retail investors, inducing greater idiosyncratic volatility in returns.
Volatility of firm fundamentals
Recent research proposes that a link between idiosyncratic volatility and firm fundamentals could explain the late 1990s idiosyncratic volatility trend, arguing that fundamentals had become more volatile (Wei and Zhang 2006) or more opaque (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 2006) . These explanations are at least partially consistent with the new evidence we present. The fundamentals of low-priced stocks are quite possibly more volatile because they are also less closely followed by analysts due to limited institutional involvement in these stocks, thus reducing the information content of these asset prices and financial statements. For this to be a complete explanation, however, the volatility of fundamentals explanation must shed light on why the volatility of fundamentals for low-priced stocks suddenly increased in the 1990s, and then, just as suddenly, dropped back to normal levels by 2003.
The same argument applies to the explanations of Fink et al. (2005) and Brown and Kapadia (2007) , who argue that the trend in idiosyncratic volatility is related to the stock market listing of increasingly less mature or more risky firms.
26 A similar point applies to Irvine and Pontiff (2009) , who argue that the trend in idiosyncratic volatility is related to increasingly competitive product markets. For any of these explanations to fully explain the evidence, the trends in firm maturity or market competitiveness must have reversed over the past few years. In summary, it is possible to correlate a trend in idiosyncratic volatility with other trends, such as that in the volatility of firm fundamentals, accounting information quality, firm maturity, market competitiveness, and undoubtedly others. But it appears, at least to us, much more difficult to find explanations for both the ebbs and flows in idiosyncratic volatility. An episodic phenomenon, such as the level of idiosyncratic volatility, needs to be explained by another episodic phenomenon.
Illiquidity
To the extent that the methods we use to measure idiosyncratic volatility are misspecified, it is possible that an omitted common factor whose importance has changed over time might account for the observed pattern in idiosyncratic risk. In particular, small firms, and those with low prices, might comove more with a factor reflecting liquidity risk. We therefore employ the liquidity factor of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) in an attempt to determine whether the factor's own variability and firm loadings on this additional factor might account for the increase in idiosyncratic risk. In untabulated results, however, we find no evidence that the exposure to this extra factor captures the increased volatility levels. Furthermore, we use monthly market turnover to control for liquidity in our cross-sectional regressions. The link between speculative retail trading and idiosyncratic volatility is significant, even after accounting for turnover.
Microstructure biases
One obvious issue with comparing volatility across firms with different share prices is that microstructure effects mechanically introduce greater bias into the volatility of low-priced stocks than high-priced stocks. This is pointed out by Ohlson and Penman (1985) , as well as by Dravid (1988) in the context of stock splits. However, just like the volatility of fundamentals explanation, microstructure biases are less able to explain an episodic spike in idiosyncratic volatility.
To investigate whether market microstructure effects can explain the difference between the idiosyncratic volatility of high-and low-priced stocks, we perform a simulation study following closely the setup of Hasbrouck (1999) . We assume that the unobserved true returns of high-and low-priced stocks have the same volatility, but in the actual data, returns are contaminated by price discreteness and bid-ask spreads. Since the relative importance of both price discreteness and bid-ask spreads depends on the price level, the volatility of the observed returns also differs between high-and low-priced stocks. However, our stimulation study indicates that, for realistic levels of price
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Related to microstructure effects, low-priced stocks might simply have more "outlier" observations resulting in higher idiosyncratic volatility. If the number of these observations has increased over time, it could potentially explain the finding that the increase in idiosyncratic volatility is concentrated in small, lowpriced stocks. We find, however, that various filters designed to delete outlier observations barely affect the observed trend. Upon deletion of such outliers, the level of idiosyncratic volatility of small, low-priced stocks decreases slightly but shows the same trend that we find for the full sample. Campbell et al. (2001) document a steady increase in the idiosyncratic volatility of individual firms through the late 1990s, while the aggregate market volatility and industry volatilities remained constant. This apparent rise in idiosyncratic volatility is one of the most actively researched asset pricing puzzles. Over the past few years, new research has lined up the 1990s time trend in idiosyncratic volatility with other trends that are potentially related.
Summary and Conclusion
We present new evidence related to this idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. We show that idiosyncratic volatility dropped to below pre-1990s levels by 2003, reversing any evidence of a time trend in the 1962-1997 time period. We also show that the high and rising idiosyncratic volatility patterns are particularly acute in firms with low share prices. We interpret the new results as indicating that the rise in idiosyncratic volatility through the 1990s was an episodic phenomenon rather than a time trend, and at least partially induced by the trading of retail investors. Using small-trades data from ISSM/TAQ and brokerage data, we provide several pieces of evidence that support this conjecture.
First, we show that retail investors dominate low-priced stocks. Second, we show that idiosyncratic volatility patterns are stronger (idiosyncratic volatility levels are higher and trend estimates are more positive) among stocks with a greater concentration of retail investors. Third, we show that around stock splits or other attention-grabbing events, increases (decreases) in idiosyncratic volatility levels are associated with increases (decreases) in retail trading intensity. Overall, our evidence links retail trading with idiosyncratic volatility.
While other explanations for the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle have been proposed, our new evidence raises the bar for potential explanations. It is necessary to explain both the increase in idiosyncratic volatility throughout the 1990s and also the more sudden drop in idiosyncratic volatility over the past few years.
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